(UNCLASSIFIED)

(UNCLASSIFIED)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ES402-22-04 3 Feb 2021

(U) WHAT INSIGHTS ARE DERIVED FROM OPERATION ANACONDA IN REGARDS TO THE NCO COMMON CORE COMPENTENCY (NCOCCC) OF OPERATIONS? (U) (MLC 402-22-04) The NCOCCC of Operations is a combination of operational skill sets that, when mastered by senior leaders can save lives and ensure effective unified action. Some of its key tenets include: Large-scale combat operations; understanding operational and mission variables; resolving complex, ill-structured problems with the use of Mission Command; and understanding how to integrate the different branches of the military into successful joint operations (Department of the Army [DA], 2020). This final principle of conducting joint operations becomes increasingly important as contemporary conflicts continue to venture further into the realm of multi-domain warfare (Marr, 2018). In order to execute such a complex task, Joint Force Commanders (JFC) must “integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations” through the use of seven Joint Functions (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2017, p. III-1). One of these functions, Command and Control, is how the JFC directs the forces toward accomplishment of the mission, and its essential task is to “Communicate and ensure the flow of information across the staff and joint force” (JCS, 2017, p. III-2). This task is critical to the creation of a shared understanding, which allows the separate branches to work seamlessly together toward a common goal. The absence of this unifying component hinders missions and increases casualties. In Operation ANACONDA, JFC Major General (MG) Hagenbeck failed to create such a shared understanding with his subordinate Air Force assets, which contributed to increasing the amount of casualties his forces incurred. Although the warning order was published on 6 January, MG Hagenbeck did not notify the Combined Force Air Component Commander of Operation ANACONDA until 23 February, just days before the operation began (Fleri et al., 2003). The insights gained from this case study are failure to ensure the flow of information across the joint force, caused downstream effects in planning and preparation that led to diminished air support during the initial stages of the operation. As noted by Lambeth (2005) in his comprehensive analysis, “because so little air support had been requested…coalition troops entered the fight virtually unprotected by any preparatory and suppressive fire” (pp. 204-205). Operation Anaconda provides a clear case of how proficiency in the realm of Operations can result in fewer U.S. casualties.

Kenneth P. Mullan/MLC 20-008 [email protected]

APPROVED BY: MSG Trevor Petsch

(UNCLASSIFIED)

(UNCLASSIFIED)

References

Fleri, E., Howard, E., Hulkill, J., & Searle, T. R. (2003). Operation Anaconda case study. College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education.

Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2020). The Noncommissioned Officer Guide (TC 7-22.7).

Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2017). Joint Operations (JP 3-0). https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018 -11-27-160457-910

Lambeth, B.S. (2005). Air power against terror: America’s conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg166centaf.13?seq=1

Marr, S. (2018). Stability in Multi-Domain Battle. U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.

1

M422 Influencing FTX Mission

Overview

In your battalion, LT Pete Quandry, has recently taken over an infantry platoon with 30 Soldiers

and 4 Bradleys. Because he just came on board as a PL, he needs to learn a lot about weapon

systems and procedures. The former PL left nothing on paper to help him get oriented.

The platoon is currently in a state of flux because PSG Joe Forte, just left. SSG Ed Newell, a

squad leader, has been promoted from among his peers without a change in rank to replace him.

Apparently, the company commander CPT Powers was very dissatisfied with the previous PL

but had a lot of respect for the former PSG because he kept the Soldiers in line. He clearly has

high expectations of the new PL and the platoon and has already given him responsibility for a

new tactical mission. He and the CPT agree that this will be a great opportunity for him to

develop his technical skills. The PL also hopes it will be an opportunity to show him that his is

competent.

Background

Apparently, CPT Powers found it so frustrating to work with the former PL that he often

communicated directly with PSG Forte. PSG Forte had the reputation for being highly

demanding and directive with the platoon. (See attachment 1.)

PSG Newell knows a lot about weapon systems and procedures. The new PL is pleased that he

seems interested and willing to share his expertise. The new PL will need to rely heavily on him

to successfully accomplish the mission next week.

The platoon has a mix of experienced and newly enlisted Soldiers. Several were in combat

together. Attachment 2 is an early interaction with PSG Newell about the platoon.

The training records indicate that all of the Soldiers are current on their PT and weapons

qualifications and Newell reports that the platoon has consistently met training standards.

2

However, the new PL has some serious concerns about platoon performance because during

recent FTX, he observed that the Soldiers piled out of the vehicles and lit cigarettes rather than

setting up a secure perimeter as their battle drill dictated. He made an on-the- spot correction

and later counseled Newell about this.

One week before the mission

On Monday morning this week the PL discovered that one of the leader books was not up to

date in the garrison. He addressed this immediately with the appropriate squad leader and

emphasized the importance of knowing the whereabouts of Soldiers at all times. Later in the day

he discussed the issue with PSG Newell who expressed a great deal of frustration because he

had addressed this and other issues with the squad leaders previously and they seem to “yes”

him without following through.

On Tuesday, there was an accident with one of the Bradleys in a training exercise. PSG Newell

verbally reprimanded the Soldier and squad leader who were directly involved. (See attached

accident report.)

This morning (Wednesday) the PL met with PSG Newell to discuss details of the upcoming

mission and his concerns about platoon performance. During the meeting he informs the PL that

CPT Powers contacted him late in the day yesterday to inquire about how things were going

with the mission. The PL was stunned to hear this because CPT Powers could have easily

reached him yesterday at that time of day.

There is only have a few days left to motivate the troops and prepare for the mission.

Attachment 1. An interaction with one of the NCOs

LT Quandry: How are things going?

SSG Pearson: Well, it’s been much better now that Forte has gone.

LT Quandry: How so?

SSG Pearson: Well to be honest Forte was always breathing down our necks. I mean we need

direction but we don’t need to be told how to tie our shoelaces. Here’s a classic example. Once

3

he noticed that one of my Soldiers was late one morning. This Soldier was usually pretty good

about showing up on time and I was planning on speaking with him about it afterward. Before I

could get to him, Forte called me aside and told me what to say to the Soldier, how to say it and

wanted me to report back to him about how the Soldier responded. I rarely got a chance to

handle anything by myself. It wasn’t just me…neither did anyone else.

LT Quandry: How do you think the Soldiers responded to him?

SSG Pearson: Well, some of them loved him, especially if he liked them. But mostly he

intimidated them and all they really worried about was how he was going to react to things. It

was like being a Squad Leader didn’t really matter that much to them.

Attachment 2 (PS2). An interaction with PSG Newell about the platoon

LT Quandry: I would be interested in hearing any insights that you have about the platoon.

PSG Newell: Well, PSG Forte was hard on us, but everyone trained to standards.

LT Quandry: How about the personnel?

PSG Newell: They’re good Soldiers, but two of our squad leaders, Amodio and Kane, don’t get

along very well. It’s been going on a long time. Amodio was Forte’s favorite so Forte always

compared the other squad leaders to him. Kane didn’t really hit it off with Forte, even though he

had combat experience and so did Forte.

LT Quandry: How do the other Soldiers get along?

PSG Newell: Well to be honest with you there are a few Soldiers who have always seemed to be

at each other’s throats. It’s been going on a long time and has never caused serious problems. I

think because people were afraid of what Forte might do. But now that he’s gone…well it kinda

worries me.

LT Quandry: Sounds like something we need to keep an eye on.

Accident report attachment.

4

5

6

In another platoon, is 1LT Anthony Santo, PL of a FSMC ambulance platoon with 5 wheeled-

ambulance squads. His platoon has been deployed for three months in a DSCA mission. There

has been no activity, but the need for emergency medical services could occur at any time.

It has been difficult to keep the troops motivated this period of deployment. The environment is

extremely hot and buggy. The PL senses a gradual decline in morale in many of the units, not

just his own.

The PSG, Tim Loyola, has been having a lot of difficulty with SSG Lewis, an ambulance squad

leader in the platoon. The PL has a close working relationship with PSG Loyola, whose

judgment in general is respected and trusted. However, while he usually exhibits a high level of

restraint and composure when dealing with personnel discipline issues, increasingly the PL has

noticed that he has been losing his temper, particularly in dealing with SSG Lewis.

Background

Loyola complains that Lewis isn’t getting his job done properly and drinks too much. He finds

it totally unacceptable that Lewis is not more conscientious about following SOPs. Loyola

believes firmly in adherence to procedures and regulations. He thinks that something should be

done about it. Although the PL agrees that maintaining standards in the field is important, he

wonders if the PSG is sometimes overreacting to what seem to be minor infractions.

On more than one occasion Loyola observed Soldiers performing tasks that really should be

handled only by Lewis. When asked about this, they say, “our SSG trusts us” or “he’s asked us

to help him out.” The last time it happened Loyola insisted on knowing where Lewis was. The

Soldiers said that they didn’t know. Later Lewis told Loyola that he wasn’t feeling well that

morning.

SSG Lewis’ record of past work performance is mostly good. His rescue efforts in combat are

practically legendary. When he was a CPL, he extracted a Soldier who was impaled on a steel

pole and administered emergency care, which kept him alive until he reached the treatment

facility at BSA. The PL that he served under during that time is now CPT of the medical

7

company. CPT Mahan still remembers Lewis and even asks about him from time to time.

However, Lewis has had more than his share of “counseling sessions” for minor infractions

mostly associated with preventative maintenance checks and services over the past few years.

And there is a letter of reprimand (attachment 1) in his file for disorderly conduct some time

ago.

The PL is aware of “personal history” between PSG Loyola and SSG Lewis. Apparently they

were good friends but had a falling our several years ago prior to Loyola’s promotion to PSG.

SSG Lewis is very well liked in the platoon; he is quick witted and entertaining. It seems that

the Soldiers in his squad trust him and will do almost anything for him.

The CO CDR, CPT Mahan, is primarily concerned with ends rather than means. As long as the

job gets done, he is not too concerned with official policy. He takes a hands-off approach and

feels that any good PL should be able to handle personnel problems within the platoon. He also

has an extremely liberal attitude concerning alcohol and has been very lenient about enforcing

alcohol policies in the past. He believes that “Soldiers need to unwind” and he seems to recall

fondly his own youthful bar room adventures that were a source of good fun and camaraderie.

Shortly before the unit was deployed, there was a very serious alcohol related accident that

resulted in significant damage to emergency service equipment in another medical company.

The battalion commander posted a memo on the Army’s substance abuse prevention policy

(attachment 2) at that time.

Recent events

Late in the day yesterday SSG Lewis approached the PL and asked to speak with him about

problems that he is having with PSG Loyola. The PL told him that he could not meet with him

at that time and would get back to him about it.

It is morning, and the PL is walking through camp when he comes across SSG Lewis and PSG

Loyola in the middle of an argument:

PSG Loyola (forcefully): And what’s up with these sloppy supply records? Can’t you keep

8

anything straight? SSG Lewis (calmly): I am sorry they’re out of order, here I’ll double check them and… PSG Loyola (shouting): Is that alcohol I smell on your breath? Huh? Drunk on duty! I am going to nail you for this! SSG Lewis (defensively): I am stone sober! I drank until late last night, off duty. I am sober this morning… PSG Loyola (shouting): Bull! If you didn’t drink so much maybe you could keep things straight around here! SSG Lewis (shouting): What the hell is your problem? You don’t treat other squad leaders like this. PSG Loyola (shouting): Like what? Huh? How do I treat you? You must think I’m stupid… The PL can see that SSG Lewis’ eyes are blood shot, but he does not appear to be drunk

otherwise. The argument is escalating.

Attachment 1: PS 3

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY XXX MEDICAL BATTALION UNIT #XXX

APO AP XXXXX-XXXX XXXX-XX 14 April, 2005 MEMO FOR: CPL John Lewis From: XXX MED BN Subject: Letter of Reprimand 1. Investigation has shown that you, CPL John Lewis, did, on or about December 18, 1999, at 129 Sentinel St. Norfolk, VA disturb the peace and engage in drunk and disorderly conduct, in violation of Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). This offense is so serious that, had I elected to punish you under the provisions of Article 15 of the UCMJ, you could have been subject to incarceration or involuntary separation from the United States Army. 2. You are hereby reprimanded. Your actions have brought discredit upon yourself and require me to seriously question your judgment and sense of responsibility. Drunk and disorderly conduct is a serious offense which reflects badly not only on you as a person but as a member and representative of the Unites States Army. 3. I will not tolerate this type of behavior from a member of my unit. Be advised, should I be made aware of any future information concerning this type of behavior, I will take swift action, possibly resulting in your punishment under the provisions of the UCMJ and possibly your involuntary separation from the United States Army. 4. Examine your career objectives and determine which course you will follow. It’s up to you.

9

5. You will acknowledge receipt of this reprimand below. If you wish, you may attach a written statement or additional documents to this reprimand which will be attached to this document in file. If you choose to do so, such attachments must reach my office by 15 January, 2000. LTC Paul Jarmin, Commander, XXX MED BN

10

Attachment 2. PS 3 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY XXX MEDICAL BATTALION UNIT #XXX APO AP XXXXX-XXXX XXXX-XX 8 July, 2005 MEMORANDUM FOR BATTALION LEADERSHIP SUBJECT: Alcohol Awareness

1. References: AR 600-85 Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP) 2. Most of you are aware of the recent alcohol-related accident that resulted in serious injury to Army personnel and irreparable damage to medical equipment in our BN. In the aftermath of this unfortunate accident, I direct your attention to Army policy and procedures aimed at preventing alcohol abuse in the workplace. Outlined below are key aspects of the policy. I urge you to review AR 600-85 Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP) in full and be prepared to fully implement this program as necessary.

3. Alcohol Policies and Controls a. We will keep the workplace alcohol free. Also, alcohol will not be the center of attention at Army functions. b. Misconduct resulting from drinking alcohol, or impairment while on duty will not be tolerated. c. Leaders will ensure that subordinates are held responsible for their actions and are aware of alcohol abuse and its consequences. d. Leaders will refer Soldiers for screening, treatment, or prevention training if they know that Soldiers are abusing alcohol. e. Leaders are encouraged to do surprise inspections in the unit, not only to ensure alcohol is not present on duty, but also to promote safety and good order and discipline. f. If leaders suspect alcohol abuse, they must confront the suspected Soldier regardless of rank or performance or conduct. g. Even if a Soldier refers him/herself for treatment, he or she is still responsible for his/her actions. Furthermore, if treatment fails, he or she must be removed from the Army. h. If a Soldier is identified as having a problem with alcohol, he or she must successfully complete ASAP education or a rehabilitation program in order to remain in the Army.

11

4. Alcohol Sanctions

a. Soldiers may be punished under UCMJ (Articles 111 and/or 112) or separated from the Army if they are involved in serious alcohol related offenses (more than two DWI convictions in a 1- year period). b. Any Soldier who performs duties with a blood alcohol level of .05 percent or above will be subject to UCMJ and administrative disciplinary action. The only exception to this is if the Soldier was unaware of the duties that needed to be performed at the time the Soldier became impaired. c. Detoxification and appropriate treatment will be provided to any Soldier diagnosed as alcohol dependent. Jim T. Swagart LTC, XX Commanding

䌀伀䴀䴀唀一䤀䌀䄀吀䤀伀一匀

吀刀䄀䤀一䤀一䜀  䴀䄀一䄀䜀䔀䴀䔀一吀

䰀䔀䄀䐀䔀刀匀䠀䤀倀

倀刀伀䜀刀䄀䴀  䴀䄀一䄀䜀䔀䴀䔀一吀

伀倀䔀刀䄀吀䤀伀一匀

刀䔀䄀䐀䤀一䔀匀匀

䌀伀䴀䴀唀一䤀䌀䄀吀䤀伀一匀㨀 䌀漀洀瀀攀琀攀渀琀 一䌀伀猀 愀爀攀 攀昀昀攀挀琀椀瘀攀 挀漀洀洀甀渀椀挀愀琀漀爀猀⸀ 一䌀伀猀 挀愀渀渀漀琀 氀攀愀搀Ⰰ 琀爀愀椀渀Ⰰ 挀漀甀渀猀攀氀Ⰰ 挀漀愀挀栀Ⰰ 洀攀渀琀漀爀Ⰰ 漀爀 戀甀椀氀搀 琀攀愀洀猀 眀椀琀栀漀甀琀 琀栀攀 愀戀椀氀椀琀礀 琀漀 挀漀洀洀甀渀椀挀愀琀攀 挀氀攀愀爀氀礀⸀ 吀栀椀猀  挀漀洀瀀攀琀攀渀挀礀 椀渀挀氀甀搀攀猀㨀 嘀攀爀戀愀氀 ⠀倀甀戀氀椀挀 匀瀀攀愀欀椀渀最⼀䴀椀氀椀琀愀爀礀 䈀爀椀攀昀椀渀最猀⤀ 愀渀搀 圀爀椀琀琀攀渀 ⠀䔀渀最氀椀猀栀 愀渀搀 䜀爀愀洀洀愀爀⤀ 挀漀洀洀甀渀椀挀愀琀椀漀渀猀⸀ 䄀氀猀漀 椀渀挀氀甀搀攀猀㨀 䄀挀琀椀瘀攀 䰀椀猀琀攀渀椀渀最Ⰰ 䌀漀氀氀愀戀漀爀愀琀椀漀渀Ⰰ 䘀愀挀椀氀椀琀愀琀椀漀渀Ⰰ  一攀最漀琀椀愀琀椀漀渀猀Ⰰ 匀漀挀椀愀氀 䴀攀搀椀愀Ⰰ 䐀椀最椀琀愀氀 䌀漀洀洀甀渀椀挀愀琀椀漀渀猀Ⰰ 䴀攀搀椀愀 䔀渀最愀最攀洀攀渀琀Ⰰ 匀琀愀昀昀 匀琀甀搀椀攀猀Ⰰ 愀渀搀 䐀攀挀椀猀椀漀渀 倀愀瀀攀爀猀⸀

倀刀伀䜀刀䄀䴀 䴀䄀一䄀䜀䔀䴀䔀一吀㨀 一䌀伀猀 愀猀猀椀猀琀 琀栀攀椀爀 漀昀昀椀挀攀爀 挀漀甀渀琀攀爀瀀愀爀琀猀 椀渀 洀愀渀愀最椀渀最 䄀爀洀礀 瀀爀漀最爀愀洀猀 琀栀愀琀 猀甀瀀瀀漀爀琀 匀漀氀搀椀攀爀猀 愀渀搀 䘀愀洀椀氀椀攀猀⸀ 吀栀椀猀 挀漀洀瀀攀琀攀渀挀礀 挀漀洀瀀氀攀洀攀渀琀猀 爀攀愀搀椀渀攀猀猀 愀渀搀 椀渀挀氀甀搀攀猀㨀  吀栀攀 䄀爀洀礀 匀愀昀攀琀礀 倀爀漀最爀愀洀Ⰰ 䄀爀洀礀 䌀愀爀攀攀爀 吀爀愀挀欀攀爀 ⠀䄀䌀吀⤀Ⰰ 䠀甀洀愀渀 刀攀猀漀甀爀挀攀 匀礀猀琀攀洀猀Ⰰ 䴀椀氀椀琀愀爀礀 䨀甀猀琀椀挀攀 倀爀漀挀攀搀甀爀攀猀Ⰰ 琀栀攀 䄀爀洀礀 䘀漀爀挀攀 䴀愀渀愀最攀洀攀渀琀 䴀漀搀攀氀 ⠀䠀漀眀 琀栀攀 䄀爀洀礀 刀甀渀猀⤀Ⰰ 䄀爀洀礀 䌀漀洀洀甀渀椀琀礀  匀攀爀瘀椀挀攀 ⠀䄀䌀匀⤀ 倀爀漀最爀愀洀猀Ⰰ 愀渀搀 琀栀攀 匀漀氀搀椀攀爀 昀漀爀 䰀椀昀攀ⴀ吀爀愀渀猀椀琀椀漀渀 䄀猀猀椀猀琀愀渀挀攀 倀爀漀最爀愀洀 ⠀匀䘀䰀ⴀ吀䄀倀⤀⸀

吀刀䄀䤀一䤀一䜀 䴀䄀一䄀䜀䔀䴀䔀一吀㨀 一䌀伀猀 愀爀攀 搀椀爀攀挀琀氀礀 爀攀猀瀀漀渀猀椀戀氀攀 昀漀爀 琀爀愀椀渀椀渀最 椀渀搀椀瘀椀搀甀愀氀 匀漀氀搀椀攀爀猀Ⰰ 挀爀攀眀猀Ⰰ 愀渀搀 琀攀愀洀猀⸀ &#x