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A New Era for Nuclear Security Author(s): Martin B. Malin and Nickolas Roth Source: Arms Control Today, Vol. 46, No. 5 (JUNE 2016), pp. 8-15 Published by: Arms Control Association Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24878314 Accessed: 19-06-2019 13:39 UTC

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By Martin B. Malin and Nickolas Roth

A New Era for Nuclear Security

The 2016 nuclear security summit was a pivotal moment for the decades

long effort to secure nuclear material

around the globe. More than 50 national leaders

gathered in Washington for the last of four

biennial meetings that have led to significant

progress in strengthening measures to reduce the risk of nuclear theft.

These summits have played a critical role in nurturing that progress by elevating the political salience of nuclear security and providing a forum for world leaders to announce new commitments, share information, and hold one another

accountable for following through on promised actions.

The international community is now entering the post-summit era, in

which nuclear security will probably receive less-regular high-level political attention than it has in recent years. Yet, there is still critical work to be

done to reduce the danger that nuclear weapons or the materials needed to make them could end up in the hands of a terrorist organization such as the Islamic State. Governments still do

not agree on what nuclear security priorities are most pressing or how best

to sustain the momentum generated by the summits. As the era of summitry recedes, will states continue improving measures to prevent nuclear theft and sabotage, or will the summits turn out to have been a high-water mark for nuclear security efforts?

Progress at the 2016 Summit Over the course of the summit process, the participating states committed

themselves to dozens of cooperative initiatives seeking to strengthen aspects of nuclear security, reduced

vulnerabilities in their security systems,

and pledged to continue joint efforts through multilateral groups and international institutions. The 2016

summit, held March 31-April 1 in Washington, marked progress on all of these fronts.

Like the 2010 summit in Washington, the 2012 summit in Seoul, and the

2014 summit in The Hague, this year's meeting produced a consensus-based communique. At the three most recent

summits, smaller groups of participants also produced a series of joint statements and group commitments, or "gift baskets."1 At this year's summit, all

but three states participated in at least one of 18 gift baskets or nine joint

statements, which covered a range of areas, including insider threats, transport security, minimization of the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and cybersecurity.2 Among the most important outcomes of the recent summit was the establishment of a

Martin B. Malin is executive director of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. From 2000 to 2007, he was director of the Program on Science and Global Security at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Nickolas Roth is a research associate at the Project on Managing the Atom. Parts of this article draw from the authors' article with Matthew Bunn and William H. Tobey in 2016 titled "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement or Dangerous Decline?"

By Martin B. Malin and Nickolas Roth

A New Era for Nuclear Security

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Research reactor fuel made from highly enriched uranium is prepared for removal from Vietnam on June 29, 2013.

contact group, which will meet annually to discuss nuclear security.

Some of the major accomplishments of the summit are listed below.

Strengthening the commitment to

nuclear security. China and India joined 36 states that had signed on to

an important 2014 summit initiative on strengthening nuclear security implementation.3 Members of this group committed to "meet the intent" of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear security principles and recommendations, conduct self

assessments, host periodic peer reviews of their nuclear security, and ensure

that "management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent," along with several other actions. This was

an important commitment for China and India, demonstrating a measure of transparency and reassurance on

nuclear security. Prior to the 2016

summit, neither country had been open to participating in such initiatives although both nuclear-armed states face terrorist threats.4

The summit process also helped to build support for a foundational and legally binding international nuclear security instrument. After more than a decade, the 2005 amendment to the

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) reached

the required number of ratifications to

enter into force in May. The amendment outlines nuclear security principles and requires states to establish rules and regulations for physical protection. It also requires a review conference five years after entry into force and, if members choose to have them, additional review conferences at

intervals of at least five years.5 The

amended CPPNM, now officially known as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and

Nuclear Facilities, could be a helpful tool for states to hold one another

accountable for maintaining physical protection and strengthening norms.

Reducing nuclear security vulnerabilities.

In addition to announcing new commitments, the summits were

occasions for states to report on steps

they had taken to remove or eliminate HEU or plutonium, convert reactors, improve physical protection, strengthen regulation, and contribute support to the IAEA or other international nuclear

security work.

At the recent summit, Japan and the

United States announced the completion of a commitment they made in 2014 to remove more than 500 kilograms of nuclear weapons-usable material from Japan.6 Argentina announced it had eliminated the last of its HEU, making it the 18th state to clean out all of its

nuclear weapons-usable material since the beginning of the summit process. Indonesia declared it had eliminated all

of its fresh HEU and planned to get rid of all its HEU in 2016.

China announced the opening of its nuclear security center of excellence. Since 2010, China has worked with the United States to build the center

as a hub for training, bilateral and

multilateral best practice exchanges, and technology demonstration.7 The center will help China test and strengthen its own nuclear security measures and will

Research reactor fuel made from highly enriched uranium is prepared for removal from Vietnam on June 29, 2013. Sandor Tozser/IAEA

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provide a venue for cooperation with others in the region and beyond.

The White House reported that 20 states hosted or invited peer review missions through the IAEA or from other states. Many other states

announced that they had strengthened nuclear security laws or regulations, upgraded physical security, or updated the list of threats against which their

nuclear facilities must be protected. Continuing the dialogue. An important

new gift basket created a nuclear security contact group that will convene annually on the margins of the IAEA General Conference. The

contact group will carry forward the consultative element of the summit

process, providing a forum for senior government officials to meet and

discuss current efforts, evaluate progress

on previously made commitments, and identify future priorities. If states

buy into the idea of the contact group and take action to strengthen it, the group, whose membership is open to states that did not participate in the summits, could be an important vehicle for sustaining international nuclear security cooperation.

The summit also produced statements on bilateral nuclear security discussions between key countries. For example, China and the United States agreed to increase cooperation on nuclear terrorism prevention and conduct an annual dialogue on nuclear security.

In addition, summit participants agreed to action plans for the IAEA, the

United Nations, Interpol, the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Destruction, and the Global Initiative to Combat

Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The plans outline the roles these organizations will play in supporting ongoing nuclear

security discussions now that the summits have ended.

Gaps and Missed Opportunities In their communique, the participants in the 2016 summit pledged to "continuously strengthen nuclear security at national, regional, and global levels."8 Striving for continuous improvement is the right way to frame

the challenge of providing effective and sustainable nuclear security. Unfortunately, summit participants missed important opportunities to give added momentum to the effort. The

following issues continue to require attention.

Still no global standard for nuclear

security. Although the amended

CPPNM establishes general security principles, it lacks specific standards or guidelines and applies only to materials in civilian use. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 requires states to provide "appropriate effective" protection for all materials, among other relevant measures, but does not specify what constitutes appropriate effective protection.9 IAEA recommendations, to which dozens of states have

now publicly subscribed, provide somewhat more specificity, but their

implementation is voluntary. Although the summit process certainly helped produce a shared understanding of the importance of nuclear security, it fell

short of producing a consensus on a meaningful minimum global standard.

If a global standard was beyond reach during the summits, a public commitment to stringent nuclear security measures among the states possessing the biggest stocks of HEU and plutonium would have been a consequential step. Although China's and India's endorsements of the

initiative on strengthening nuclear security implementation was an

important development, Russia's absence from the summit and Russia's and

Pakistan's refusal to sign that statement is a significant gap in the patchwork of

nuclear security commitments. Furthermore, the summit outcomes

were not comprehensive. Although the summit communiques explicitly covered "all" nuclear material, most

of the concrete progress from the

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives for an April 1 plenary session of the nuclear security summit in Washington. During the summit, China and India joined an initiative on strengthening nuclear security implementation.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives for an April 1 plenary session of the nuclear security summit in Washington. During the summit, China and India joined an initiative on strengthening nuclear security implementation.

Saul Loeb/Getty Images

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Chilean President Michelle Bachelet (left) talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) at the summit on April 1.

meetings focused on civilian materials, largely ignoring the roughly four-fifths

of the world's remaining HEU and plutonium that is controlled by military organizations.10

A mixed picture on implementation.

Nuclear facilities in many countries still

are not protected against the full range of

threats. States with large stocks of nuclear

weapons-usable material still contend with corruption and extremism.11 On

the ground, security upgrades remain

urgently needed in many spots around the world. One indication of the extent of

the inconsistent application of physical protection measures is that, after all of

the high-level attention since the 2010

summit, at least six countries—Argentina,

Brazil, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden—still do not have armed

guards at their nuclear facilities.12

The collapse of U.S.-Russian bilateral cooperation is particularly alarming. Without Russian and U.S. commitments

to rebuilding their bilateral nuclear

security relationship, it will be impossible

for the two states that possess roughly

80 percent of the world's weapons-usable nuclear material to reassure one another

that their nuclear security is sound.

Slippage of consolidation and

minimization goals. The Obama administration put laudable effort into cleaning out HEU and plutonium from many countries and minimizing the use of HEU elsewhere. Yet, political obstacles will likely make substantial additional progress more difficult than in the past, in particular for the hundreds of kilograms of HEU in Belarus and South Africa. Conversion of

additional HEU-fueled research reactors

to use low-enriched uranium fuel,

particularly but not only in Russia, is hampered by technical challenges and political inattention. Moreover, summit participants failed to reach agreement, even in principle, on stopping or reversing the buildup of separated plutonium.13

Continuing culture of complacency in

some countries. The summits put the

notion of nuclear security culture on the agenda for many countries where it previously had been neglected. Nevertheless, workers, managers,

policy officials, and even national leaders in many places still dismiss the threat of terrorist theft or sabotage

as remote or implausible.14 Many

organizations handling nuclear weapons, HEU, or separated plutonium do not have specific programs focused

on strengthening security culture. The IAEA has still not published its nuclear security culture self-assessment

guide.15 The summit process helped spark interest in strengthening security culture, but much more work is needed.

Need for more-robust channels for

dialogue. The political momentum created by the summits will not likely be re-created through other organizations, although the contact group, IAEA ministerial meetings, a review conference for the amended

CPPNM, and other forums certainly will provide important opportunities for discussion, reporting on progress, and further cooperation.

The recent summit's action plans did not significantly expand or strengthen the global nuclear security architecture. The IAEA has assumed greater responsibility for convening high-level discussions on nuclear security and has intensified its nuclear security efforts

since the first summit. Yet, the agency

still deals only with civilian material and has no authority to require states

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Chilean President Michelle Bachelet (left) talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) at the summit on April 1. Alex Wong/Getty Images

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to take any action on nuclear security.16 The nuclear security capacities of the UN and Interpol are even less robust,

and the multilateral groupings, the GICNT and Global Partnership, remain unchanged by the action plans the summit participants produced.

Finally, Russia's absence from the recent summit may bode ill for

out of reach for the present. Yet, a

group of states like-minded emanating from within the contact group or a special working group of the GICNT could develop a set of principles and guidelines that they pledge to apply to all stocks of nuclear weapons, HEU, and plutonium and invite other states to join them. Such a commitment

that are needed. The United States

should expand nuclear security cooperation with China, India, and Pakistan, sharing additional information on security arrangements without revealing sensitive information that

would increase vulnerability to terrorist attack. The United States also will need

to make a priority of discussions with a

In the interest of promoting cooperation,

the summits frequently focused on pluckJng

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the successful implementation of the summit action plans. Moscow's leadership and cooperation in all of the organizations referenced in the action

plans will be necessary for many key

nuclear security steps.

Progress in the Post-Summit Era In the interest of promoting

cooperation, the summits frequently focused on plucking low-hanging fruit, while failing to advance more-difficult discussions of threats and persistent challenges. Governments must focus not only on what is most feasible but also on

what is most urgently needed in light of the evolving threats they face.17

Nuclear security efforts should have

a clear goal: ensuring that all nuclear weapons and the materials that could be

used to make them, wherever they are in

the world, are effectively and sustainably secured against the full range of threats

that terrorists and thieves might plausibly

pose.18 Building an international

consensus around such a goal will be a major challenge for the next U.S. president and for like-minded leaders.

The 2016 summit communique alludes to the goal of continuous improvement. Achieving that goal will require work on several fronts. Here are some of the most

important areas of focus.19

Building up the commitment to stringent

nuclear security standards. A legally

binding set of international standards

for nuclear security is unfortunately

should include the provision of well trained, well-equipped on-site guard forces; comprehensive measures to protect against insider threats;

control and accounting systems that can detect and localize any theft of weapons-usable nuclear material;

protections against cyberthreats that are

integrated with other nuclear security measures; effective nuclear security rules and regulations and independent regulators capable of enforcing them; regular and realistic testing of nuclear security systems, including force-on force exercises; a robust program for

enhancing security culture; and regular assessments of the evolving threat of

theft or sabotage. Following the example of the initial group of adherents, the

accumulation of international support for more-comprehensive standards could grow over time.

In the meantime, leading states that are bound by the amended CPPNM should push to universalize the treaty, and the states that have joined the initiative on strengthening nuclear security implementation initiative

should encourage others to commit to implement IAEA recommendations and accept peer review.

Implementing effective and sustainable

security measures on the ground.

Commitments to stringent standards are meaningful only if they translate into real improvements. Bilateral

cooperation can help spur the actions

wide range of countries on enhancing their own nuclear security, providing resources when needed.

Despite tensions over Ukraine and other issues, Russia and the United States

should agree to a package of cooperation that includes nuclear energy initiatives, which are of particular interest to

Russia, and nuclear security initiatives, which are of particular interest to the

United States. Although it is unlikely in the current political environment, one mechanism for achieving this goal would be to restart the U.S.-Russian

Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security Working Group, which facilitated dialogue from 2009 until it was suspended in 2014 because of tensions

between the two countries. Cooperation should no longer be based on a donor recipient relationship but on an equal partnership with ideas and resources coming from both sides.20

Increasing efforts to reduce the number of

sites where nuclear weapons and weapons

usable materials are stored. Today there are fewer locations where HEU and

plutonium can be stolen because of removals motivated by the summit process. The consolidation process must continue. Stringent security requirements can help to incentivize the process of consolidation, as can well-funded programs for conversion of HEU-fueled reactors and removal

of material. Russia and the United

States, as the countries whose nuclear

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A member of the security force at the Chinon nuclear plant patrols the plant site near Avoine, France, on January 6, 2012. Data from a recent report indicate that at least six countries do not require their nuclear facilities to have armed guards.

stockpiles are dispersed in the largest number of buildings and bunkers, should each develop a national-level plan for accomplishing their military and civilian nuclear objectives with the smallest practicable number of locations. The United States and other interested

countries should ensure that plutonium and HEU bulk processing facilities do not spread to other countries or expand in number or scale of operations and

that no more plutonium is separated than is used, bringing global plutonium stocks down over time.

Establishing a nuclear security culture

that does not tolerate complacency about

threats and vulnerabilities. Every country with relevant materials and facilities

should have a program in place to assess and strengthen security culture, and all nuclear managers and security-relevant staff should receive regular information,

appropriate to their role, on evolving threats to nuclear security. At the same time, interested countries should launch

initiatives to combat complacency, including a shared database of security incidents and lessons learned; detailed

reports and briefings on the nuclear

terrorism threat; discussions among intelligence agencies, on which most governments rely for information about the threats to their country; and an expanded program of nuclear theft and terrorism exercises.

Building up channels for dialogue. Countries must continue to share

information and devise plans to meet current nuclear security challenges. The IAEA ministerial-level meetings on nuclear security will provide an important forum. If parties to the

amended CPPNM elect to meet every five years to review progress, this process

could create important opportunities to place high-level pressure on states to

step up nuclear security commitments and implementation.

A more comprehensive scope of cooperation, including on military

materials, could take place in multilateral forums. The GICNT, co

chaired by Russia and the United States and still valued by both, consists of more than 80 states committed to

the group's statement of principles, which includes improving measures that reduce the risk of nuclear theft

such as accounting, control, and

protection of nuclear and radiological materials. The group has not focused

on these preventive approaches so far, but it should in the future.21

This summer represents the GICNT's 10th anniversary, which would be an excellent time to announce the creation

of a GICNT working group focused specifically on strengthening security for nuclear materials and facilities. The

GICNT could also be a useful forum for

Russia and the United States to expand nuclear security cooperation.

The contact group created at the nuclear security summit this year holds promise for facilitating dialogue,

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A member of the security force at the Chinon nuclear plant patrols the plant site near Avoine, France, on January 6, 2012. Data from a recent report indicate that at least six countries do not require their nuclear facilities to have armed guards.

Alain Jocard/AFP/Getty Images

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Khammar Mrabit, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Division of Nuclear Security, speaks on June 12, 2014, at a meeting in Vienna on promoting entry into force of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

sharing information, and germinating joint activities. Its openness to all IAEA members has the advantage of potentially attracting states beyond the ring of past summit participants. Its size and heterogeneity, however,

may limit the depth and effectiveness of the discussions. The contact group should select an executive committee of

member state representatives—perhaps former summit hosts plus Russia, if

it chooses to join—to establish and coordinate its agenda for discussion.

Finally, summit-level nuclear security meetings could be continued on the side of Group of 20 meetings, perhaps once every four years. This would sustain

the kind of executive-level political attention to nuclear security that summits provided.

The nuclear security summits periodically pressed participants to

commit themselves to new and stronger measures for preventing nuclear terrorism. They facilitated a process of stocktaking and reporting on the concrete actions participants had taken. Moreover, they were a vehicle for forging stronger international collaboration on bolstering nuclear