Council on Foreign Relations

Report Part Title: UNDERSTANDING WOMEN’S ROLES IN TERRORISM

Report Title: Women and Terrorism

Report Subtitle: Hidden Threats, Forgotten Partners

Report Author(s): Jamille Bigio and Rachel Vogelstein

Council on Foreign Relations (2019)

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep21428.4

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3Understanding Women’s Roles in Terrorism

Understanding and addressing women’s paths to radicalization and the roles they play in violent extremism is crucial to disrupting terror- ists’ abilities to recruit, deploy, and abuse them. To reduce the evolving terrorist threat at home and abroad, U.S. counterterrorism strategy should recognize and address the roles of women as perpetrators, miti- gators, and targets of violent extremism.

PERPETRATORS

Throughout history, women have joined and supported violent extrem- ist groups, serving as combatants, recruiters, and fundraisers and in numerous other roles critical to operational success. Although women are often ignored in conventional depictions of violent political actors, they have been active participants in 60 percent of armed rebel groups over the past several decades.1 In Algeria, for instance, female National Liberation Front fighters evaded checkpoints in the 1950s to deploy bombs at strategic urban targets. In Sri Lanka in the 1990s, all-female battalions earned a reputation for their fierce discipline and ruthless combat. Women represented nearly 40 percent of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), serving in all operational roles, including as combat unit leaders, allowing the group to vastly expand its military capacity.2

Women have also helped found militant groups, from Germany’s Baader-Meinhof gang to the Japanese Red Army. Even in cases where women’s leadership was invisible, they frequently provided operation- ally critical support, ranging from weapons transport to combatant recruitment. Women have also contributed to the normalization of vio- lence: between 1921 and 1931, for example, the women’s wing of the Ku

UNDERSTANDING WOMEN’S ROLES IN TERRORISM

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Women and Terrorism4

Klux Klan attracted a membership of more than half a million, and their participation in widespread lynching campaigns made targeted political violence more acceptable and even respectable in some communities.3

Violence

Today, women-led attacks are on the rise. Several all-female extremist cells have been disrupted in recent years, from a group of ten women in Morocco found obtaining chemicals used to make explosives, to a woman and her two daughters in London plotting to attack tourists at the British Museum.4 Female members of Boko Haram have been so effective—killing more than 1,200 people between 2014 and 2018—that women now comprise close to two-thirds of the group’s suicide attack- ers.5 Attacks by women have been growing not only in number but also in severity. In Nigeria, the most deadly incident in 2018 involved three women bombers who killed twenty people in a crowded market- place.6 In Indonesia, the deadliest attacks in decades were carried out by two family units that included both women and children.7 Female suicide attacks are more lethal on average than those conducted by men: according to one study of five different terrorist groups, attacks carried out by women had an average of 8.4 victims—compared to 5.3 for attacks carried out by men—and were less likely to fail.8

While some women are kidnapped and forcibly conscripted into violence, many voluntarily join extremist groups for reasons similar to those of male recruits, including ideological commitment or social ties.9 Others join in hopes of gaining freedom and access to resources; in Nigeria, for example, some women joined Boko Haram to receive Koranic education in a region where only 4 percent of girls have the opportunity to finish secondary school.10

Recruitment and Operational Support

Women also participate in recruitment, fundraising, propaganda dis- semination, and other forms of material support for violent extrem- ism. In 2014, a network of fifteen women across the United States was charged for transferring thousands of dollars to al-Shabab militants in Somalia, using small transactions and coded language to avoid detection.11 Palestinian women have been arrested for running fraud- ulent charitable organizations that funneled money to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In Indonesia, police identified a pattern of women mar- rying foreign Islamic State fighters and then remaining in the country

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5Understanding Women’s Roles in Terrorism

to fundraise. And in Pakistan, wives of Jemaah Islamiyah leaders served as the group’s bookkeepers and managed significant fundrais- ing efforts.12

Women also play a wide variety of auxiliary roles that can be inte- gral to the operational success of extremist groups. Armed insurgencies abetted by women control more territory and are more likely to achieve victory over government forces, in part because women’s participation signals greater community support, increases perceived legitimacy, and contributes to tactical effectiveness.13 Radical white nationalist leaders across multiple groups in the United States have commented that wom- en’s participation stabilizes membership, and that women are more likely to remain as members than men.14 For insurgencies or terrorist groups focused on state-building, such as the Islamic State, women carry out essential tasks that bolster capacity, like feeding and clothing combatants, transporting weapons, and educating new recruits. Across ideologies, women play a crucial role in indoctrinating their families, facilitating both radicalization and terrorist recruitment.15 In Islamic State–held territory, for example, women raised the children they had brought with them and gave birth to over seven hundred more as part of a strategy to grow the caliphate.16

Modern extremist groups use social media to actively enlist women into supportive roles, reaching unprecedented numbers through nar- rowcasting—creating a targeted message for a specific subgroup.17 For instance, the Islamic State’s concerted campaign to recruit Western women emphasized camaraderie, sisterhood, and opportunities to enjoy freedom and adventure as state-builders.18 Nearly 20 percent of Western recruits to the Islamic State are female, a markedly higher rate than in other Islamist jihadi groups.19

Once enlisted, women are also especially effective as recruiters: one study of online pro–Islamic State groups found that female recruiters had higher network connectivity than men, making them more effective at spreading the Islamic State’s message than their male counterparts— an important finding given that an increasing number of extremists are radicalized online. Women’s participation also improved the survival rate of online pro–Islamic State groups, extending the time before tech- nology companies shut them down.20

Accountability and Reintegration

Criminal justice responses often fail to address the diverse roles that female members of extremist groups hold. Many female members of

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Women and Terrorism6

the Islamic State joined voluntarily and played active roles in recruit- ing tens of thousands of foreign fighters to the cause. However, after women voluntarily join, some are required to remain against their will and coerced into continued service.21 Local women in Iraq and Syria, for instance, often found themselves coerced into service for the Islamic State in order to survive when their homes were overtaken by militias.

Other women are targeted and trafficked into extremist groups and forced to perpetrate crimes. Boko Haram strategically kidnapped young girls and teenagers and forced many into suicide missions, rais- ing questions about their agency and accountability.22 Other trafficking victims, however, become sympathetic to the group after exposure to its ideology.23 Some female members of Boko Haram who had initially been forced into service decided to stay in the group voluntarily after finding they had access to resources and power unavailable to them in their home communities.24

Despite the complexities of women’s roles in violence, officials in criminal justice systems around the world often assume that women who commit violence are either naive victims of circumstance or dan- gerous deviants from the natural order. Correspondingly, approaches to women’s repatriation and reintegration vary significantly with respect to their criminal and civil accountability.25

Criminal justice leaders sometimes view women as casualties of terrorism regardless of their motivation, resulting in fewer arrests for terrorism-related crimes and shorter-than-average sentences.26 This phenomenon has occurred across the United States and Europe; in the Balkans, governments do not account for noncombatant support pro- vided by female affiliates of the Islamic State, and most female return- ees avoid prosecution altogether.27

In other cases, officials in criminal justice systems have imposed overly harsh consequences for female returnees as compared to their male counterparts. German courts have charged women returning from Syria with war crimes while indicting men under domestic terror- ism legislation.28 Although the United States and the United Kingdom have permitted many male foreign fighters to return and face trial, both governments refused reentry of female Islamic State affiliates—includ- ing Shamima Begum and Hoda Muthana—and revoked their citizen- ship. In Iraq, female Islamic State affiliates face the harshest possible punishments—death or life in prison—even when the women have not been involved in violent acts and argued they had been coerced into traveling to Islamic State territory.29

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7Understanding Women’s Roles in Terrorism

Once female extremists are identified, prison and rehabilitation programs designed for men fail to address the underlying causes of women’s radicalization.30 Women who joined violent political groups such as the FARC in Colombia and the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam reported that membership provided greater freedom than could be found in traditional society.31 When female fighters return to communities where social norms remain unchanged, they some- times rejoin extremist groups, a trend observed with female members of Boko Haram in Nigeria and FARC women in Colombia (who were less likely to demobilize than male members between 2003 and 2012).32 Furthermore, programs often fail to provide training in livelihood skills that could help women support themselves and their children, instead offering training in stereotypically feminine, low-wage activities such as hairstyling and sewing.33 And few programs provide adequate ser- vices for women’s specific needs, such as appropriate support for vic- tims of trauma or sexual violence.34

Children also complicate the reintegration of female returnees. In some cases, communities that are willing to embrace returnees refuse to accept descendants of terrorists.35 For children born in war zones, issues of citizenship present a serious challenge for social services, and states have not reached consensus about responsibility for and repatri- ation of this population.36 And as their parents await judgment, many children languish in dire conditions. Some children, including Sham- ima Begum’s infant son, have died in custody.37

As governments determine their approaches toward repatriating and holding accountable Islamic State–affiliated women, thousands wait in Iraqi displacement camps.38 Without either a comprehensive criminal justice response or sufficient resources for rehabilitation, returning women are likely to fall through the cracks.

MITIGATORS

Women are already on the front lines when it comes to preventing and countering violent extremism in their communities. Yet their voices remain sidelined from mainstream counterterrorism debates. Incorporating women’s distinctive perspectives can lead to better intelligence gathering and more targeted responses to potential secu- rity threats. Women-led civil society groups are particularly critical partners in mitigating violence, though counterterrorism efforts too often fail to enlist them.

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Women and Terrorism8

Predictors

Women are well positioned to recognize early signs of radicalization because attacks on their rights and physical autonomy are often the first indication of a rise in fundamentalism. Women are substantially more likely than men to be early victims of extremism, through harassment in public spaces, forced segregation, dress requirements, attacks on girls’ schooling, and other violations.39

Women’s central roles in many families and communities also afford them a unique vantage point from which to recognize unusual patterns of behavior and forecast impending conflict. In Afghanistan, women observed that young men were being recruited at weddings; after their concerns went unheeded, these recruits killed thirty-two civilians on a bus.40 In Libya, local women warned of rising radicalism after observ- ing an increased flow of Western female recruits, signaling a growing market for wives as the Islamic State expanded its stronghold. They also reported rising attacks on their own rights, including harassment for driving without a male guardian.41 As in Afghanistan, these warnings were disregarded, providing the Islamic State leaders additional time to establish a headquarters before counterterrorism efforts ramped up.

Security Actors

Female security officials provide distinct insights and information that can be mission critical. Women serving as security leaders are able to conduct searches of female fighters in ways that men often cannot; stra- tegically deploying women can thereby prevent extremists from evad- ing screening. Female security officials also have access to populations and sites that men do not, allowing them to gather critical intelligence about potential security threats.42 Furthermore, women’s participation in the military and police has been shown to improve how a local com- munity perceives law enforcement, which, in turn, improves their abil- ity to provide security.43

The underrepresentation of women in security roles, however, creates a vulnerability that terrorist groups exploit to their advantage. Women comprise just 15 percent of police forces globally; in South Asia, women make up less than 2 percent of the force in Pakistan, less than 7 percent in Bangladesh, and less than 8 percent in India.44 Female combatants can hide suicide devices under their clothing knowing that they are unlikely to encounter a female security official and therefore will not be searched. Without efforts to improve gender gaps in national

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9Understanding Women’s Roles in Terrorism

security roles, female extremists will retain an advantage in eluding sus- picion and arrest.

Preventers

Traditional efforts by governments and nongovernmental organiza- tions to combat radicalization typically focus on outreach to predom- inantly male political and religious leaders. However, the prominent role that many women play in their families and communities ren- ders them especially effective in diminishing the ability of extremist groups to recruit and mobilize.45 Women are well positioned to chal- lenge extremist narratives in homes, schools, and social environments. Women have particular influence among youth populations, a frequent target of extremists. In more conservative societies—where communi- cating with women is limited to other women or their male relatives— women have unique access to intervene with women and girls at risk of radicalization.46

Small-scale efforts to involve women show promise. A program in Morocco deploys women religious scholars around the country to counter radical interpretations of Islam—they were better able to reach community members than their male counterparts because of their social ties and ability to build trust.47 In Nigeria, an interfaith group of Muslim and Christian women came together in the wake of an extrem- ist attack and successfully supported community policing efforts in regions with high levels of intercommunity violence.48 An Indonesian program provided wives of incarcerated jihadis with psychological and economic support, which helped them rehabilitate and reintegrate for- merly violent combatants into their community, breaking the cycle of extremism.49

Despite the important role women can play as preventers of terror- ism, women’s groups are rarely considered relevant partners in coun- terterrorism efforts, and their work remains chronically underfunded. Furthermore, when counterterrorism officials develop policy without input from local women, they risk entrenching harmful social norms about women’s place in society that undermine women’s rights.50 In addition, regulations intended to cut down on terrorist financing are making it harder for women’s groups—including those that work against radicalization—to function.51 Women’s civil society organiza- tions are typically smaller and less financially resilient, making it difficult for many of them to meet the compliance requirements associated with counterterrorist financing regimes. In some instances, governments

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Women and Terrorism10

from Egypt to Russia have criminalized feminist activity in the name of counterterrorism, targeting women’s civil society organizations that challenge the status quo in their countries.52 Ensuring that women’s groups can receive funding without falling afoul of antiterrorism laws would increase their contributions to counterterrorism efforts, while also fulfilling the state’s obligations under international law to ensure nondiscrimination and equality.

TARGETS

Many extremist groups benefit both strategically and financially from the subjugation of women. A number of terrorist groups use human trafficking as a means to recruit new members and finance their oper- ations.53 The Islamic State systematically bought and sold women and girls through sales contracts notarized by Islamic State–run courts.54 The group attracted thousands of male recruits by offering kidnapped women and girls as “wives,” and generated significant revenue through sex trafficking, sexual slavery, and extortion through ransom.55 The United Nations estimated that ransom payments extracted by the Islamic State amounted to between $35 million and $45 million in 2013 alone.56 This practice is deployed by other terrorist groups as well: in northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, Boko Haram abducts women and girls as a deliberate tactic to generate payments through ransom, exchange prisoners, or lure security forces to an ambush.57 Some of these kidnapped girls are then coerced into suicide attacks; in fact, one in three of Boko Haram’s female suicide bombers is a minor.58 Sexual violence is also a tactical tool to enforce population compliance, socialize combatants and encourage unit cohesion, displace civilians from strategic areas, and drive instability.59

Not only is violence against women and girls a tactic of violent extremists, but it is also a potential warning sign for mass killings. A third of individuals associated with jihadi-inspired attacks inside the United States had a record of domestic abuse or other sexual violence.60 In the United States, a study of FBI data on mass shootings between 2009 and 2015 found that 57 percent of victims included a spouse, former spouse, or family member, and that in 16 percent of cases, the attackers had a history of perpetrating domestic violence.61

The stigma associated with sexual violence waged by extremists remains a potent force that marginalizes women in the economic sphere and can result in isolation and a loss of marriage prospects, leading to a lifetime of poverty.62 Children born of rape frequently experience

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